Monday, August 27, 2012

BÙI DIỄM * CHIÊN TRANH

Bài Phỏng Dịch Tiếng Anh

The Vietnam War and Two Concepts for Building Society


International Conference
The Vietnam War and Europe 1963 - 73
Paris, January 24-25, 2003

Dear Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honor to be here with you today, participating in the International Conference "The Vietnam War and Europe", and I'd like to thank the organizers for their kind invitation.

Thirty years after the Paris Treaty, I believe that we have had enough time for the contribution of ideas relating to an historic war that that devastated my country in those previous decades. I hope that these contributions will help everyone gain a clearer understanding of the events that transpired and, if possible, result in a few good lessons for the future. This conference is an admirable initiative of the Diplomatic and Strategic Association and the European Historical Center for the 20th Century.

I have been invited to participate in the subject debate "An American War". I have quite few ideas on the subject and will present them later. However, the conference has been organized to both coincide with the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Paris Treaty and to review the roles played by Europe during the Vietnam War period.  Therefore I cannot ignore the memorable special atmosphere of the May, 1968 time frame in Paris.

Paris - May 1968

At that moment it was springtime and everyone expected and hoped for peace after enduring a long and destructive war. It was a joy to have Paris as a site for negotiations by the parties involved in the war. Indeed, in all quarters of Europe, as well as everywhere else, it had been agreed that Europe, particularly France because of her neutral stance toward the war, was the most appropriate nation to host the meeting. It had been hoped for that due to relations with both sides France could secretly facilitate the negotiations.

But, due to several unfortunate historical events, France was in a chaotic state when the first negotiations between the American and North Vietnamese delegates began. The streets of Paris erupted in demonstrations by students and agitators of the so-called "68 generation." Barricades were erected throughout the Latin Quarter, the location of most of the universities, as well as the site of the most volatile student demonstrations.  It was if France was paralyzed and there was a question as to whether this was the beginning of a revolution. During that period, my office was in the United States and I began a weekly shuttle between the two capitals of Washington and Paris. But due to the unusual situation, my flight from New York had to land at Bretigny, a military airport, instead of Orly airport. And many times I had to drive all the way up to Brussels to board my flight back to the United States.

I mention these memories only to recall the special atmosphere at the time of the negotiations. Furthermore, the demonstrations weren’t a phenomenon peculiar only to France. The disorder caused by students and agitators was no less throughout Europe, particularly in Germany and by the anti-war faction in the United States. In reality, this was a social phenomenon, a rebellion of a generation against the society that raised it. The Vietnam War opposition might have a political flavor, but the overall background was that of a chaotic society not connected to the Vietnam War and Vietnam was merely an excuse.  At that time, we were still a long way from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the legacy of Communism, therefore, no one was surprised if those demonstrations seemed to support the leftists in Europe and else where, because of the thought that this was a modern trend.

The efforts of Europe as an intermediary

The negotiations on Vietnam began in such a special environment public opinion saw them as a concrete effort to find a solution for the ongoing war without realizing that in several past instances intermediaries had attempted to arrange contacts between the adversaries. The efforts by Europe to mediate on this matter were numerous, this we all know, and the fourth negotiating session of the conference would have time to explore the matter in detail.  I only want to review, as I recall, a few cases that I followed to commend Europe's efforts at peace.

In 1966, while the war was intensified and rampant, Poland, through its representative in the International Control Committee (ICC), together with Italian representative in Saigon, tried to find a way to narrow the distance between the viewpoints of the parties involved. At a higher level, at the beginning of 1967, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Soviet Union Prime Minister Alexis Kosygin also tried to organize a peace conference. Since 1965, France had secretly facilitated meetings between Hanoi’s representative, Mr. Mai Van Bo, and an American diplomat, Mr. Edmond Guillion. In this same spirit, and perhaps with the implicit agreement of the French it seemed to have the naturally consent of the French Foreign Ministry, two Frenchmen, Mr. Aubrac and Mr. Marcovich, agreed to cooperate with Doctor Kissinger (a quasi-official American representative at the time) to deliver a memorandum from Washington to the leadership in Hanoi. There were many less important efforts, such as Sweden's, that did not achieve concrete results; they all reflected the serious concerns of Europe toward the Vietnam War. And if the conference, today, wants to review the role of Europe in the peace efforts for Vietnam then it is justified.

An American War

In the 60's, 70's and thereafter, the leftists or anti-American faction and the majority of international media often labeled Vietnam War as "an American War". The intensified involvement of American in Vietnam, particularly since 1966, could explain the reason for such labeling, and not far from the truth. In fact, who could deny the presence of half a million American soldiers in South Vietnam? But although this presence was obvious to me (and many independent historians that I knew) it was neither the most profound nor sole cause of the war. Back in time, the 1954 Geneva Treaty concluded the first Vietnam War (the so called Indochina War) and divided Vietnam into two regions at the 17th parallel, one could easily see that America had a limited concern about Vietnam. It was only after the treaty was signed that the concern was increased with the establishment of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This concern continued to intensify with the tension of the Cold War, particularly after the Korean War, and following the unsettling actions of Mao Tse-Tung in China and especially after the Communist International Organization openly supported the North Vietnamese regime.


Vietnam - Two Countries

Naturally, the 1954 Geneva Treaty recognized the independence and unity of Vietnam as one nation and one people. But this treaty also divided Vietnam into two regions and defined the national mechanism for each region. For our side, the Saigon government held powers in the South, and the same was also true for the Hanoi government in the North. Therefore, there were two Vietnams that were officially recognized internationally. The Republic of Vietnam in the South was recognized by the free world, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North was recognized by communist nations in the North. We should remember that before the Geneva Agreement divided the country, the nation of Vietnam was recognized by 35 countries, and in September, 1952, despite a veto by the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly cast 40 votes for and 5 votes against, with 12 abstentions for a resolution accepting the nation of Vietnam into the United Nations.  After the Geneva Accords the nation became the Republic of Vietnam, an independent nation in the South.

Historical View of Division

In considering the aspirations of the Vietnamese people the continuously hoped for a united country.  The division of the country into two parts by the Geneva Agreement was situation of the time that no one wanted, but had to be tolerated due to the historical and international conditions.  As a matter of consolation, one can recall the period when the country was divided into North and South at the 18th parallel over two centuries ago, and could only be reunified by Emperor Gia Long at the beginning of 19th century.  Moreover, this wasn't a unique case if one considers the division of East and West Germany or South and North Korea. Therefore, after the Geneva Treaty, the people in South Vietnam accepted reality and hoped that the two independent nations could maintain the status quo until such time as conditions permitted a peaceful reunification, such as in the past.

Foreign Intervention

However, the situation of these two independent nations didn’t last. Conflict between the two began early on, and remained smoldering during the early 60’s before becoming an open war. In Vietnam’s special environment with the Cold War intensifying the United States intervened in accordance with its containment policy in stopping the communist wave. The same was true for the policy of expansionism and multi-unity of the Communist bloc with the brotherly socialist countries supporting the North.  If there was a divergence it was that a strong overt support to the South in almost all areas, while at the same time in the North intervention was cleverly disguised.  Therefore, the wartime presence of some 200,000 Chinese troops in the North only belatedly came to light after the war concluded.

It is not my intention to take sides with such kind of support from the United States.  To the contrary, during the years I worked in America I had the opportunity to see the awkward political machinations of the United States replete with contradictions and mistakes. But in case of Vietnam, the claim that the United States aspired to expand its territory or power leading to the conclusion that the Vietnam started as a result of American intervention is absurd and far from the truth.

If the presence of American Forces in the South is now seen as a hindrance to the independence and unity of Vietnam I would like to remind you that as of October 1966 at an international conference in Manila, the capital of the Philippines seven nations allied with South Vietnam merged to strongly urge the inclusion of a provision in the Joint Communiqué asserting that all foreign troops, specifically the American troops first, must withdraw from Vietnam six months after the war ceased and this request was approved by the conference.  Additionally, if the 1973 Paris Treaty was perceived by the parties involved as binding, and this document definitely resolved the issue of United States troops in Vietnam, meaning that the “United States War” was over, and it was no longer the American War, then the question remaining is why did the war continue for two more years?

An Ideological Struggle

Due to its boisterousness and strength American support had, indeed, misled the essence of the war in Vietnam while covering over one of the main causes of the war.  Truly, if every Vietnamese had hoped for independence at the beginning of the previous century, at the time the France colonist government still controlled all of Vietnam, there was a remarkable difference between the patriots and other political groups on the methods for struggle against the colonists for the future of Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communist Party wanted to construct a society according to Marx - Lenin (the struggle of the classes, dictatorship of the proletariat, land reform etc.) while the national parties, although vague, wanted to build a society respectful of individual freedom.  On the one side the omniscient model was so simplistic that only afterwards could one be able to realize its cruel nature, and on the other side were the experiments of a multifaceted nature in political plurality that were criticized by some as being less effective.  Hence, from the beginning, the main factor here was a conflict of thought and ideology, especially when each patriotic organization had to carry separate struggles in secret to avoid the watchful eyes and oppression of the French Colonialists. The two events clearly reflecting these two tendencies both occurred at the same time in 1930, the uprising at Yen Bai of the Vietnam Nationalist Party and the Soviet Nghe-Tinh incident of the Vietnam Communist Party.

As time went by, this ideological struggle evolved into an uprising, especially after the Communist Party seized control of the administration in August 1945. And if during the war against the colonialist French the Communist Party could hide under the guise of researching Marxism, and then later change to the Labor Party with the administration of this party only talking about a joint national government then its objective was to mobilize the masses, rather than a true desire to cooperate with the other forces in the movement against the French to gain independence.  And then the Bao Dai solution was born. The rift between the Nationalists and Communists deepened and became more manifest with the Geneva Agreement dividing the country. Now it became more of a legal question of an international nature more than a domestic issue governing the relations between the two sides, with each side having its own life style and own political regime.  This situation was also accepted by the nations of the Communist Bloc, because in January 1957, the Soviet Union proposed that the United Nations accept both regions, South and North into the United Nations as two separate and independent nations.

But the unification issue still remains

Naturally there was still the unification issue, an issue that the governments of both sides held different concepts. While the South wanted to temporarily maintain the status quo in order to have time to heal the wounds of war and rebuild the nation for the first time with independence reluctantly returned by the French, and therefore seek a solution for future reunification, the North was obsessed with the ambition of exerting Communism throughout the country even with the cost of a fratricidal war of mutual destruction. In other words, one side envisioned a passive reunification and one side reacting drastically due to blindly believing in revolutionary doctrine and “international duty” of the Communists. Thus the war between the two regions became inevitable, regardless of whether or not there was foreign intervention.

The situation actually happened that way, to the grief of an entire people

Within the confines of the conference and due to the limited time I cannot express all the grief, suffering and destruction borne by the Vietnamese people in both regions during and after the war. Hundreds of books and analyses that have been published addressed this issue.  But for this particular conference please allow me to present a few views of my own regarding the record of the Vietnam War.

The Paris Treaty

Firstly, concerning the Paris Agreement, one could clearly see that the agreement did not bring about peace, but to the contrary it was a continuation of the war.  The North got what it wanted: U.S. Forces withdrew completely from the South while they were able to maintain their forces in the South.  The United States didn’t receive anything other than the return of Prisoners-of-War as a small consolation.  In his recent book “No Peace, No Honor” American author Larry Berman, who participated in the conference, evaluated the conference as an American betrayal of Vietnam, because the war continued after the signing of the document.

At this point I must say that I do not intend to invoke a debate as to the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the war, a debate which I believe is not beneficial since the war concluded some 30 years ago.  Since then too much water has flowed under the bridge and many present generations do not remember or do not know that a war occurred.  But we must remember that in the framework of the Cold War the war in Vietnam was a confrontation between the two doctrines of communism and nationalism, and between total dictatorship and freedom and democracy.

Like a person, a country also has an individual fate. The fate of Vietnam was right after World War II when the Communist Party took advantage by seizing power in the North in 1945 and by implementing resistance against France until the 1954 Geneva Accords. Thereafter, for more than 20 years there was an effort to viciously attack the South under the banner of reunification concluding with the collapse of Saigon in 1975. The Communist Party must bear responsibility before the people and history concerning what happened in the homeland for more than half a century in the North, and for more than a quarter century this party has governed both regions.  At this point perhaps I should add that intoxicated by victory, the communists often boast of driving out both the French Colonialists and the American Imperialists, and that they are the paramount of mankind.  But shortly after the victory one could see the humiliating reality and long series of frustrations. Following the victory, for one entire decade the Communists totally applied Marxist-Leninist theory throughout the nation, invaded Cambodia to complete their “international duty” and self-isolated themselves, putting the nation in chaos, and pushed the people into poverty. In the meantime, on the international front, history surpassed the expectations of many:  Communist China escaped the fervor of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, carrying out reforms beginning in 1978 and the following year gave brethren socialists in Hanoi a bloody lesson.  Afterward came the collapse of Communist regimes in Europe, and finally the disintegration of the Soviet Union. All at once, the world suddenly realized that Communist models were no longer appropriate for modern times, meaning total bankruptcy as Dang Xiaoping, and in turn, Gorbachev later admitted.

Victory becomes defeat, defeat becomes victory

After the Paris Treaty in 1973 and the victory in the style of Pyrrhus “conquer in order to lose,” the Vietnamese Communist Party, due to their mistakes, led the country into a serious crisis toward the end of the 80's. Standing on the brink of an abyss, the party searched for ways to reverse course.  For the previous few years it was often said that there was some progress by Vietnam on the path to “Doi Moi” (renovation, or new change) making life easier than before for the people. But some forgot that such progress stemmed from libertarian measures that the Communist Party had denounced and sought to nullify. Facing the realities of today’s world, the Vietnam Communist Party realized that their plan for constructing society had become worthless and obsolete.  But non-communist Vietnamese both at home and abroad expressly hoped that this obvious condition would become more readily apparent. They didn’t desire to assert their own doctrine, or attempt to rationalize that such doctrine (political democracy, free enterprise, and respect for human rights), was more worthy than the doctrine of the communists.  They only wanted implementation of basic conditions for the benefit of the Vietnamese people, a nationality that had been subjected to numerous hardships in the past and deserving of a better future.

Bui Diem

Paris - January 24-25, 2003

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